

6. Efforts to enact major tax cuts at the same time that the balanced budget amendment is being debated is the height of cynicism, especially the tax cuts that have been proposed in the Republican Contract with America. Those tax cuts would generate sizable revenue losses, especially in the out years, making what will already be an extraordinarily difficult task of substantial deficit reduction (let alone a balanced budget) in seven years virtually impossible without almost a near dismantling of government programs except for social security and national defense. This is the height of cynicism, as well as horrendously bad social and economic policy.

It is also important to remember that the Federal budget, by its sheer size, and because of its role as a stabilization tool, should not be considered in the same way as an individual state or local government.

HOW TO CUT THE DEFICIT

While additional long term deficit reduction is thus essential, this must be balanced with two other objectives. First, it is important that we do not further undermine the use of fiscal policy as a stabilization tool. In particular, it would be counterproductive to cut the deficit so quickly that we would dramatically weaken the economy when it is already operating below full employment. Second, we need to reduce future deficits in a manner that would not make it more difficult for us to deal with our other critical budget problem, mainly reorienting our priorities away from consumption and more toward public investment and other expenditures that are needed to support long term economic growth.

I suggest the following approaches an alternative to a balanced budget amendment.

1. Unfortunately, there is no precise rule of thumb or model simulation which can give us the optimum path for future deficit reduction. In my view, an appropriate objective would be to cut the \$400 billion deficit now projected by CBO for 2004 in half—this would suggest that over the next 10 years the nominal deficit would be roughly flat, implying a gradual decline in the deficit in real terms, in the deficit as a share of GDP, and even more importantly, in the debt to GDP ratio. Such a target would imply putting in place approximately \$15-20 billion per year of budget restraint for each year over the ten year period—in my judgment, with the safeguards I will list below, I think this is doable and will not create too much fiscal drag on the economy.

2. Spending cuts should be the top priority. In view of the large cuts in non-defense discretionary programs in the 1980s, and given the need to increase spending in some of these areas, it is unlikely that huge savings will be realized from this sector of the budget. Thus, spending cuts must come from additional reductions in military spending, from an effective health care cost control program, and from slowing the enormous growth in the entitlements, especially the pension and health programs. I would suggest that the concept of entitlements is no longer something that this country can afford. All of the so-called entitlement programs must be slowly converted to means testing, either by scaling back benefits for upper income and high wealth individuals and/or by increasing taxes on those benefits. We should reduce (not eliminate) benefits for those who could do with less—households and individuals with modest means should be spared. Furthermore, consideration should be given to further extending the retirement age for full benefits. Scaling back of health and pension benefits should not apply only to entitlement programs—public employees are now receiving extremely generous bene-

fits which are no longer affordable. Finally, I would suggest that any reductions in social security benefits partly be earmarked for investments to build for our future, especially for education and other programs which benefit primarily younger people. In effect, we would be reducing benefits for the elderly to be used to make a better life for their children and grandchildren.

3. Deficit reduction must be fair. In particular, it is now well documented that most of the benefit of the tax cuts of the 1980s went to those in the upper income groups—in the meantime, large social security tax increases and budget cuts have significantly reduced after-tax incomes for many low and middle income families. This has only been partly reversed in the 1993 budget package. Thus, it is important that deficit reduction be structured in a way that the impact is greatest on those who can afford it. Many will make the argument that increases in taxes on upper income individuals will create huge disincentives for savings and investment and thus would be counterproductive—however, as we learned in the 1980s, these arguments are exaggerated. Furthermore, the economy can not function effectively when a large and increasing share of purchasing power and wealth is concentrated in relatively few hands—this holds down demand and thus will prevent long term growth.

4. The arithmetic is very clear—even with the phasing-in of entitlement reform and some additional cuts in defense and non-defense discretionary programs, some tax increases (not tax cuts) will be needed in order to reduce deficits to acceptable levels. The assertion that the problem is not on the revenue side because tax revenues have actually increased as a result of the tax cuts of the early 1980s is inaccurate. Both personal and corporate income tax collections as a share of income and profits, respectively, are below where they were a decade ago—total tax revenues are roughly at the same ratio of GDP as they were prior to the enactment of the supply-side program primarily because of the big increase in Social Security taxes enacted in the mid-1980s, and because of other tax increases enacted along the way.

In my view, increased revenues should come first from eliminating counterproductive tax expenditures (incentives, exemptions, etc.) now in place, and then secondly, if more revenues are needed, from increasing taxes in a progressive manner on activities that we want to consume less of. Thus, broadening the tax base and consumption taxes should be considered before across the board tax increases. In the former category, some candidates are the following: eliminating or scaling back the interest deduction on mergers and acquisitions; scaling back the deduction for corporate advertising expenses and/or for corporate entertainment; a lower limit on the mortgage interest deduction than is now in place; taxation of a portion of corporate health care insurance premiums (this may also be helpful in controlling health care costs).

5. Most importantly, I believe that to the extent possible, a multi-year program designed to bring about the amount of deficit reduction described above should be adopted as soon as possible. This would be desirable for several reasons. First, it would avoid having to go through the torturous process on an annual basis—the medicine can all be taken at once. Second, and more importantly, one way to reduce the effect of fiscal drag on economic growth is to bring interest rates down as quickly as possible, especially long term rates—this can be best accomplished if the markets believe that a credible program to reduce future deficits is in place. While easier Federal Reserve policy can also

help, the Federal Reserve has lost most of its control over long term interest rates. Convincing the markets that the federal demand for credit will be dramatically reduced in the future will be a more effective way to bring down long term interest rates than an easier monetary policy.

6. It is possible to design a multi-year deficit reduction program that can allow some flexibility to deal with emergencies and recessions. This will prevent fiscal policy from worsening economic downturns. If these exceptions are truly limited, they are not likely to undermine the credibility of the long term program. I suggest that the deficit reduction program be accompanied with an "escape clause" in the form of a minimum level of GDP or employment growth, or a threshold unemployment rate, beneath which future installments of deficit reduction will be delayed or scaled back in order not to create an even weaker economic environment. This is particularly important since the current level of economic activity is so low that the economy is likely to be underutilized for many years.

MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. HATCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that we now call up a period to transact morning business.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Thomas, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session the Presiding Officer laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting sundry nominations which were referred to the appropriate committees.

(The nominations received today are printed at the end of the Senate proceedings.)

REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH HAITI—MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT—PM 8

The PRESIDING OFFICER laid before the Senate the following message from the President of the United States, together with an accompanying report; which was referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.

To the Congress of the United States:

1. In December 1990, the Haitian people elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide as their President by an overwhelming margin in a free and fair election. The United States praised Haiti's success in peacefully implementing its democratic constitutional system and provided significant political and economic support to the new government. The Haitian military abruptly interrupted the consolidation of Haiti's new democracy when, in September 1991, it